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Abstract 
 
The Compact Disc was launched in 1982 and heralded a golden age of music industry 
profitability before extensions of the same digital revolution, in the form of file-sharing, 
began, in 1999, to undermine the very foundations of commercial mediation in recorded 
music. The parallels in English football run one decade behind, with subscription based 
digital broadcasting of live matches kicking off in 1992. Much has been made of the 
successes and corruptions associated with the vast influx of revenues that have 
supposedly transformed English ‘elite’ football, but such discussions are premature at 
best. Ten years on from the advent of file-sharing in music, parallel technologies are 
emerging for the free transmission of live sporting events. This article suggests that the 
cultural differences that might have inhibited the up-take of such services amongst 
football fans, relative to music fans, have been eroded by the very hyper-
commercialization of sport which digital media once helped to facilitate but which now 
threatens or promises to undermine.  
 
Introduction 
 
Until recently popular music fans undertook copyright infringing peer-to-peer file-
sharing to a degree not emulated in sport, with its equivalent, that being ‘live-streaming’. A 
number of reasons can be given for this difference. Some of these ‘possible’ explanations are 
tenuous. It is unlikely to simply be a question of complexity, with football fans being less 
capable than music fans, or simply a question of access to computers. Recent shifts in the 
composition of football fandom,
2
 alongside the lengthening age profile of popular music 
audiences,
3
 have undercut those educational, class, income and age differences that may have 
been used to explain uneven computer access, use and skill. Gender differences exist, but 
would not help explain why music fans download, whilst football fans, until recently, tended 
not to live-stream. Alternative explanations in terms of the ‘live’ character of sport and the 
desire to watch such events as they happen, relative to the ‘recorded’ character of most on-
line music are also insufficient to explain the difference in use. Demand for live-streaming 
services has led to numerous technical innovations that have improved quality, accessibility, 
simplicity of use and reliability. As such, the most fruitful explanation was/is difference in 
fan ‘loyalty’, with music fans appearing more detached from the commercial management of 
bands they like(d) relative to football fans for whom it was/is less easy to separate following 
your team and paying its corporate owners. Downloading music and then paying more for 
live performances and paying to go to more live performances is a separation not available 
for football fans. As musicians get paid more for live performance relative to recording 
anyway (in percentage of sales terms and overall), many fans see by-passing record 
companies as a moral act. 
 
While, on the one hand it does appear that football fans retain a deeper loyalty to their 
  
clubs, in recent years this has been tempered by increased disaffection with corporate pricing, 
something that may explain the rising use of live-streaming. This article examines the case of 
Justin.tv and the attacks upon it from Sky, Setanta, the FA and the English Premier League. 
While digital media have fostered increased revenues in football, over the last ten years they 
have wrecked the recorded music industry. Digital media encouraged an economic boom in 
recorded music in the period from 1985-95 attracting corporate colonization. Digital media 
then facilitated near catastrophic declines at least for those seeking to profit from the sale of 
recordings. Football currently basks in the parallel initial revenue surge. Will it go blindly 
down the same path as the recording industry? 
 
Shifting dynamics of business and technology in music and sport 
 
In music there was a longstanding movement back and forth between concentration and 
the emergence of new competition opening up the field.
4
 New waves of popular musical 
styles and genres coincided with the influx of new record labels able to break into the market 
because they carried innovative material that caught the audience’s attention and their money.  
In time each such influx and expansion in available suppliers would re-concentrate as 
consolidation of either old majors or new ones would see a small group of labels either 
incorporate or marginalize the rest. This concertina effect of expansion and contraction ended 
in the 1980s and 1990s with the development of internal differentiation. Major labels realized 
it was safer to buy up new independent labels that carried new and rising artists. They thereby 
incorporated innovation rather than competed with it.
5
 The development of increased control 
by major labels was twofold. Increased concentration of ownership saw mergers and 
acquisitions shrink the number of ‘majors’ from double figures to three or four today. 
Secondly, this smaller number of majors bought up a greater share of what would have once 
been deemed ‘independent’ labels, even whilst often retaining the names for marketing 
purposes. This dual increase in corporate concentration within the musical field was itself 
paralleled with increased cross-media integration. Multi-national and multi-media 
concentration integrating television, music, film and other media was in large part 
encouraged by the high profitability resulting from ‘reformatting’, the requirement of music 
fans to re-stock their record collections from vinyl to CD. Major labels could afford to buy up 
prospective competition, whilst at the same time being attractive purchases for even larger 
global cross-media conglomerates.  
 
From the birth of the Compact Disc in 1982 onwards sales of music began to rise, reaching 
unprecedented levels in price, volume and profit. Recorded music became a highly attractive 
area of business. Digitization reduced costs, fostered increased sales, was used to legitimize 
higher prices for a long period, reduced losses due to damage and generally was seen as a 
perfect profit storm.
6
 Some voices at the time noted that retailing digital recordings was like 
giving away the master copies,
7
 but until the advent of cheap CD burners in the mid 1990s, 
most in the record industry were too busy counting their rising profits to be concerned. The 
perfect profit storm started to turn nasty only with the development of peer-to-peer file-
sharing at the end of the 1990s. Interestingly, the rise of digital burners (1996) and then of 
file-sharing (1999) coincides with an initially small, but then a very large shift upwards in 
audience willingness to pay for live performance.
8
 
 
In a similar fashion English football also underwent a boom in profitability, 
marketization and consumerism which was symbolized in the creation of the Premier League 
in 1992.
9
 This was a breakaway from the original English Football League. The Premier 
League acts as a Limited company, owned by the 20 member clubs who act as share holders.  
  
Cumulative club revenue is now at around 2 billion pounds stirling per season.
10
 The bulk of 
this revenue comes from the most marketable aspect of the Premier League, the games 
themselves. Television rights to show live fixtures were initially assigned to BSkyB at the 
league’s inception in 1992. The technology of 'satellite television' and also the merits of 
subscription based services were relatively untested in the United Kingdom, however the 
popularity of football and the growing quality of the players on show in the Premier League 
ensured that many fans of the game embraced the initial transition. From this point onwards 
the costs of television rights deals have risen at a very substantial rate with world-wide total 
rights revenue from 2007-2010 totaling nearly £2.6bn. £1.7bn of this is for the 6 packages 
shown live in the UK. These were purchased by Sky Sports (4 for £1.3bn) and Setanta (2 for 
£392m). Anticipation of future profits from football broadcasting can be seen in the February 
2009 announcement that Sky Sports have extended their rights from 4 to 5 packages, with 
Setanta gaining only 1 for the period of 2010-2013.
11
 The price for domestic broadcast rights 
remained unchanged however (£1.7bn), despite the severe economic downturn, whilst the 
price achieved for the sale of overseas rights rose significantly.
12
 Setanta UKs application for 
bankruptcy in June 2009 suggests that the anticipated returns from subscriptions are not being 
realized. Assumptions that economic depression would keep people at home in front of the 
television, and as such, would not depress demand for subscription based sports services 
appear to have been misguided. An economic squeeze might keep people at home, but if free 
alternatives to paying for subscription services exist, the consequences of recession do not 
look so positive for those seeking to sell hope and diversion. Richard Giulianotti and Roland 
Robertson note that 'experts' had predicted that 80% of UK households would take up 
subscription based football centered television channels, relative to a rate of 38% in 2002. 
Such expectations fueled rising bids for rights packages, but there is now little expectation 
that they will ever be realized.
13
 Giulianotti and Robertson point to the correlation between 
low subscription rates and high levels of 'piracy' in Italy. This is, in large measure, the result 
of high levels of 'piggy backing' on single satellite or cable subscriptions in apartment blocks, 
the most popular housing form in Italy. The UKs preference for houses relative to flats may 
limit the incidence of such forms of sharing, but will offer little insulation against live-
streaming.  
 
The levels in money currently spent on these rights packages has been paralleled with an 
increase over time in subscription rates viewers have to pay to watch televised Premier 
League football and the price of going to see matches live at the grounds. Season ticket prices 
have risen rapidly. In a similar fashion, these rises have been directly matched by increases in 
the price of match tickets and the average match day spend. Average admission prices have 
risen by over 200% for EPL clubs since the creation of the Premier League in 1992, and the 
average match day spend has increased by over 18 percent in the 2006-7 year alone.
14
 This 
inexorable rise in the cost to watch the sport live, be it on television or at the ground has led 
some disillusioned football fans to seek alternative methods to watch football, for a much 
more reasonable price; free. These alternative methods are centered on the use of digital 
media to stream the games illegally over the internet. Whilst football clubs in some countries 
and whole sporting leagues, such as baseball in the United States and cricket’s Indian Premier 
League offer forms of low-cost legal streaming services to fans, this is not something which 
the English Premier League’s broadcasting business plan currently appears to entertain the 
possibility of. Moves in 2010 to enable ‘streaming’ of Premier League highlights (by Sky, 
Yahoo! and ESPN), and to overseas audiences (by Leeds United Football Club), as well as in 
developing mobile streaming services to what on telephones do not significantly step outside 
the established model. Consequently, and with alarming frequency, official match broadcasts 
from rights holders here and overseas are being captured and simultaneously broadcast live 
  
and illegally on websites such as Justin.tv. In June 2009 Setanta UK declared bankruptcy. It 
had failed to gain sufficient subscribers in order to fund the payments it had committed itself 
to in purchasing rights for the matches it wanted to broadcast. This failure to achieve its 
expected audience saturation makes the question of what alternative methods are being used 
to view live matches all the more significant. Rupert Murdock had been able to withstand a 
long period after 1992 where the cost of television rights was not being recouped by means of 
audience subscriptions. This had been done in anticipation of building a long term market 
dominance through near monopoly control of broadcast rights. Large pockets and the vision 
of a future monopoly, with profits to match, were not things that Setanta could rely on. The 
threat of free streaming undermines the assumed end point and so limits the scope to secure 
funds against such a future return. Financially squeezed by clubs and broadcasters in the good 
years, and now faced with wider economic pressures, growing numbers of fans are seeking 
alternative methods to watch their team. To focus on this issue in more detail, the nuances of 
the technology involved in live streaming, the illegalities that this entails and the Premier 
League’s responses to this rapidly growing trend will form the focus of this article.  
 
File-sharing and Live-Streaming: parallels and differences 
 
File-sharing programs originally required users to up-load and down-load files through 
the central server of the service provider. This was commercially attractive as advertising 
space could be sold to appear on the central server’s interface and hence on the user’s 
computer screen. However the transmission of all traffic through such a central server was 
the legal Achilles’ heel that allowed record, film and other content providing companies to 
prosecute and close the first large scale file-sharing service Napster on the grounds of 
‘contributory infringement’ (in effect trafficking copyright infringing files). After the closure 
of Napster file-sharing services moved to direct peer to peer (distributed) formats. Then, 
when faced with legal moves against up-loaders, file-sharers moved to the use of peers 
(plural) to peer (singular) ‘torrent’ formats where users download from a stream of available 
copies so not taking a copy from any one individual up-loader. The development of peer to 
peer file-sharing has seen a cat and mouse cycle of move and countermove as legal and 
technical developments have conditioned and challenged each other.  
 
In one sense at least live-streaming resembles Napster in as far as streaming is channeled 
through a central server. In this regard live-streaming is similar to many social networking 
sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, but unlike these networks, which require friend to 
friend selection to join specific networks, live-streaming tends to have the ‘open to all’ 
character of most peer to peer and torrent services. Live-streaming services are therefore 
doubly vulnerable to legal challenge, being both directly involved in the streaming of 
potentially copyright infringing materials between users, and being wide open to being 
accessed by anyone interested in finding out what is being made available, including those 
acting on behalf of copyright holders.  
 
The specifics of Justin.tv 
 
The most prominent of the streaming websites currently is Justin.tv, a San Francisco 
based website with ‘over one million users’ at any particular point in time.15 The way in 
which the website works is that it provides a free of charge webpage for people to stream 
their own webcam, broadcast or recorded footage through. The website takes pride in the 
‘simple process’ of broadcasting, and states that ‘all you need to broadcast is a camcorder or 
webcam hooked up to an internet-connected PC or MAC computer’.16 In the thirty one days 
  
of July 2008 alone it was reported that ‘90,690 channels had been created’.17 It was also 
reported that this number had been rising every month before that time, and it would appear 
that no let-up has taken place since then.
18
 With such an ease of broadcasting it is inevitable 
that people will broadcast footage that they do not own the rights for. This coupled with such 
a vast number of channels actively broadcasting at any particular moment, makes it 
unrealistic to believe that Justin.tv, or other smaller streaming portals can be aware of what is 
being broadcast on every such channel all of the time. The question of whether the service 
provider is liable for what users broadcast, even if the provider is not aware of what such 
specific uses are going to be before they happen, or at all, has been the source of very 
significant legal dispute over the last ten years. This ability to infringe copyright and 
distribute streams worldwide is where the problem begins for rights holders, with users of 
such streaming websites hosting broadcasts of live Premier League matches free of charge. 
Illegal broadcasters can simply re-route footage of games being broadcast legally in their own 
country. The English Premier League prohibits many games from being shown live in the 
UK, on the premise that such live competition would impact on gate receipts. However, these 
matches are shown legally in other jurisdictions as part of profit maximizing country by 
country rights selling. Those wishing to live-stream, using a webcam or capture card, simply 
reproduce this footage with a 1 or 2 second delay through the use of Justin.tv’s central 
directory.  Whatever is being shown in one place, is now more than likely to be available 
everywhere else and for free.  
 
The popularity of such streams has risen to new heights in the last two years. Currently on 
match day weekends there are numerous streams for every single Premier League game being 
played. The game played between Chelsea and Liverpool on 26 October 2008 gained more 
than 574,000 individual hits during the course of the 90 minutes, and the 6 September 2008 
England away game versus Croatia had 6 separate streams available, with the most popular 
gaining just over 30,000 viewers at any one time.
19
 On a special page on their website 
entitled 'Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notification Guidelines',
20
 Justin.tv claim that 
they are not liable for the content streamed through their website and are fully compliant with 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (discussed below). Live-streaming is both live and 
mediated, being live in time, but doubly mediated in that viewing is remote and channeled 
through the service provider’s central server. File-sharing in its current form is not live and it 
is mediated only in the former sense. This means that potential scope for legal liability is 
different, as will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
Legal conflicts between the English Premier League and Justin.tv 
 
Recent press coverage from in 2008 and 2009 has highlighted the legal battle threatening 
to erupt between the English Premier League and Justin.tv.
21
 Attaching liability to a 
streaming portal such as ‘Justin.tv’ is a complicated issue as the user, not the website itself, is 
uploading the copyright infringing stream. The legislation that governs copyright violation is 
part of intellectual property (IP) law and more specifically in relation to a US based internet 
company such as Justin.tv, the 1998 ‘Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ (DMCA). This act 
passed into US law the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 1996 Copyright Treaty, a 
treaty that all WIPO signatories are required to pass into domestic legislation.
22
 The UK and 
EU have passed similar legislation, but that is not to say that each law and interpretations of 
such laws have been the same in each country. They most certainly have not, and the relative 
weigh given to human rights to privacy and free-expression relative to copyrights and 
restrictions on the free circulation of information differs from state to state even when guided 
by the same legislation.
23
 That the UK Premier League may seek to bring action in the US 
  
courts is interesting, as a number of recent US court judgments have moved away from 
strong reliance upon claims made by content industry representatives towards upholding the 
rights of new media companies to innovate without the fear that product providers will be 
held liable for the actions of users.
24
 The DMCA is being interpreted more cautiously than at 
its inception, as will be explained in more detail below. 
 
The Premier League are utilizing a part of the DMCA in an attempt to take legal action 
over websites such as ‘Justin.tv’. The specific part is titled ‘Contributory Infringements’, the 
most relevant section centered around the premise that if a computer system operator learns 
of infringement and fails to purge the infringing materials from its system, then it is liable for 
any such infringement.
25
 This was the basis upon which the DMCA was applied in the 
closure of Napster, the original file-sharing service in 2001/2. In the case of Justin.tv and the 
Premier League the accusation basically amounts to the claim that Justin.tv are aware of 
streams of live games being uploaded, but are doing nothing to prevent them. This threat of 
legal action however has done little to scare Justin.tv’s CEO Michael Siebel who states that 
he ‘does not anticipate any (legal) action’ and that Justin.tv ‘follow the guidelines set out by 
the DMCA and take content off the website when requested by a copyright holder’. He goes 
on to state that ‘The Premier League is registered with Justin.tv and is actively using the suite 
of tools that we provide to copyright holders’.26 
 
Whilst Napster was closed because it refused to actively police its content, Justin.tv is 
happy to comply with any notice it receives about infringing content. Of course, it is in the 
nature of live coverage that the report is unlikely to be effectively acted upon until the event 
has finished, and the stream terminated anyway. Whilst Napster had, and Justin.tv has a 
central server through which traffic flowed/flows, and although such a central server aided in 
the success of legal claims that Napster was engaged in direct ‘contributory infringement’, 
the same is less easy to demonstrate when the infringing material is live and transient. Where 
Napster was held capable of learning of infringement and of not acting on such knowledge, 
Justin.tv cannot be so readily accused. It is not enough to know that a product can be used for 
unlawful purposes, if it can be used entirely lawfully as well. Neither is it enough to show 
that a service is being used for infringing activities for that service’s provider to be liable of 
such usage. The file-sharing services Grokster and Morpheus successfully defended 
themselves against the Motion Picture Association of America in 2003 and 2004 using the 
dual use defense.
27
 This principle was initially established in the United States by the 
Supreme Court ‘Sony Ruling’ in 1984.  Sony was found not to be liable for the well known 
and most often copyright infringing practice of video recorder owners recording television 
programs using the ‘record’ button on their video recorders. Sony knows very well what such 
a button does and what most people will record (i.e. copyrighted material). As long as 
legitimate uses exist, the principle of dual use means that producers are not liable for users’ 
actions. Whilst US courts have hotly debated the limits of the dual use defense, Justin.tv can 
legitimately claim that they do not actively condone or know of specific infringements until 
they are reported. Service providers have been closed down for actively promoting copyright 
infringement and actively encouraging such potential to promote their services. The most 
high profile case in point here was The Pirate Bay, who’s founders received prison sentences 
in Sweden in 2009. 
28
 As long Justin.tv work with copyright holders, enabling them to report 
infringement, and as long as they seek to act on such reports, they are not liable for what 
infringement others engage in through the channels they make available. However, this may 
be too little, too late as a means of preventing streams from being broadcast in the first place.  
 
From this evidence it would seem that the English Premier League is left with the 
  
unenviable task of patrolling 90,000 plus channels themselves. Whether the ‘suite of tools’ 
offered by Justin.tv to the English Premier League is enough to claim that Justin.tv are 
actively purging infringing material may become the focus of future legal challenge, but, for 
now, Justin.tv are actively claiming that they comply and are keen to comply with the law, 
and that they are doing so even as live-streams communicated via their service make 
available all the copyrighted assets of the English Premier League. That the English Premier 
League, Football Association, Sky Sports and others are becoming increasingly anxious over 
the rise in unauthorized broadcasts of their matches, feel threatened by the potential financial 
losses, and appear uncertain whether current legal attacks upon services such as Justin.tv will 
prove effective in driving the cork back into the bottle at the narrowest point, are all well 
founded fears. Whether they have any legal grounds for turning their fears into Justin.tv’s 
legal responsibility is more tenuous, and as things currently stand, very weak. Whether the 
English Premier League continues to pursue its legal battle, given its limited likelihood of 
success, or actually try to market competitively priced live online broadcasts of the games 
themselves will an interesting debate to follow within and around future broadcasting 
negotiations. 
 
The broadcasting of live-streams of Premiership matches without the permission of the 
English Premier League or the Football Association is ‘illegal’ and ‘amount[s] to 
piracy’,29 according to the actual broadcast rights holders, namely Sky Sports and ESPN. 
ESPN is a subsidiary of the Disney corporation who bought up Setanta’s rights package when 
it went bankrupt as a loss-leading toe-hold into the European subscription television market. 
It is following the model established by Sky in using sports subscription television as the lead 
into wider services. As this article suggests, the model that Sky developed was highly costly 
and whilst it did become profitable in recent years, this is not secure even into the very near 
future. The accusation of piracy is both technically problematic and contradictory in 
consequence. Technically, in law, piracy refers to reproduction of copyrighted material for 
commercial gain, or which directly generates commercial damage, such as deliberate spoiling 
tactics designed to pass off fraudulent copies for legitimate ones. Direct commercial damage 
cannot be extended formally to inferred losses or indirect losses, such as when a fall in record 
sales is attributed to increased downloading by temporal association. The formal legal 
difference between civil infringement of copyright by file-sharers and criminal piracy has not 
stopped lobby groups and the media using the label to lump the two together. In so doing 
content industry lobby groups have been successful in popularizing the use of the term in 
relation to all forms of commercial and free infringement practices. Nevertheless this 
‘success’ in extending the term ‘piracy’ beyond its legal meaning, may have been the content 
industry’s worst mistake. The term ‘piracy’ now confers a degree of rebel cool on practices 
that might otherwise be seen as simply penny pinching. From Jack Sparrow to The Pirate 
Bay, being labeled a pirate is not seen as a bad thing. Failure to prevent live-streaming by 
technical, legal and cultural means leaves, as the only possible way to meet the challenge, the 
offering of creative and attractive alternative business models that (enough) people will be 
willing to pay for. Current proposals by Sky, Yahoo!, Sony and others to make highlights 
available for mobile computer and phone access via streaming formats does not go anywhere 
near providing full and live coverage as can be viewed via copyright infringing live-
streaming channels already. 
 
Future consequences and possibilities: alternative business models and/or alternatives 
to business models 
 
Live-streaming is unlikely to reduce demand/price/willingness to pay for actual live 
  
attendance,
30
 but it is likely to depress the revenues generated from broadcast (mediated 
access). With the live attendance market for the English Premier League now becoming 
increasingly saturated by the 'consumer fan' it would seem that in isolation illegal live-
streaming will not decrease attendance figures, but will contribute to the continuing 
transformation of the socioeconomic character of those attending football matches as 
highlighted by commentators such as King.
31
  
 
Nevertheless, clubs and leagues will need to focus more attention upon retaining 
traditionally core fans’ revenues and loyalty, as well as chasing the wider mass audience if 
free alternatives undermine monopoly controls in the domain of television viewing. If 
subscription based TV access continued to witness the kinds of price rises that have 
characterized the last decade and a half, and if similar inflation continues in ticket prices, ever 
greater numbers of traditional fans will be unable to follow their team live through legitimate 
channels, encouraging illegal broadcasts from foreign channels in pubs, or illegal streams 
broadcast live over the internet. It may be the latter development that forces change in legal 
provision, whether this is by fan defection, or through their re-incorporation by means of 
more attractive and affordable legal options. The creation of an internally excluded core fan 
base within clubs is undermining still further the foundations of fan loyalty that has until 
recently at least enabled football clubs to avoid some of the worst effects of defection 
experienced by record labels.  
 
In the recorded music industry, failure to balance profitability and the maintenance of 
legitimacy and loyalty has led the contemporary recording industry to the very brink of 
collapse, even while the very technology of digital storage, transmission and compression 
that threatens to by-pass major labels today was the same technology (applied differently) 
that enabled unprecedented profits a decade ago. It may very well have been the arrogance 
fostered by the profit boom that led recording industry managers to lose sight of the 
necessary trust that underpinned their sales. In the future, the English Premier League and the 
Football Association are going to have to find a balance between making a profit and 
including the core followers of the sport they are trying to promote.  
 
When it comes to the illegal internet streaming of matches, the English Premier League, 
Sky and other rights holders should be anxious to get this problem under control. This could 
be accomplished by introducing their own reasonably priced pay-per-view online service to 
compete with free live-streaming sites, in the same vein that illegal file sharing provided ‘a 
model for the more recent, and highly successful iTunes service’.32 It would be a further 
parallel to the music industry if live-streaming of football leads to an official subscription 
service being launched, just as it was the threat of file-sharing which enabled iTunes to get 
permission to distribute record company material over whose distribution record labels had 
until then jealously guarded their monopoly controls.
33
  
 
If the Premier League were to offer an online broadcast package or to sell the online 
rights to a separate carrier it would be following the lead of major American sports leagues 
such as Major League Baseball (MLB) who offer internet broadcast packages in the form of 
'MLB.tv'. The service provides live 'HD' quality match broadcasts, archived highlights and 
'On-Demand' viewing capabilities, all features which exceed the capabilities and quality of 
illegal streams. Priced competitively US baseball fans and others are willing to pay a small 
fee for the increased quality and reliability of official streams, rather than the unpredictability 
of illegal streams. Success in such an endeavor can be seen in the way illegal baseball 
streams on Justin.tv continue to decrease in line with cheap legal alternatives, just as English 
  
football streams increase in the absence of such legal and affordable alternatives. If the 
Premier League continue to refrain from offering an official online alternative to counter-act 
the popularity of illegal sources and it simply seeks to undertake further and more intense 
protectionist actions, it faces multiple difficulties. With the likelihood of success being low, 
the chances of being discredited and publicizing its rivals increases. Increasingly draconian 
measures run the risk of alienating fans even further and thereby increase the likelihood that 
they will seek alternatives. Finally, the longer rights holders stand back from providing cheap 
and reliable alternatives to live-streaming services the better such infringing services become, 
both in terms of the range of materials made available and in their overcoming of the very 
technical weaknesses (in terms of quality, ease of access and quality of reception) that legal 
service providers would wish to claim they can provide, and which their rivals at present 
cannot. Every passing month sees live-streaming services improve, and sees more people 
going to find this out for themselves.  
 
This paper argues that it would require a re-legitimating of pricing, allowing everyone to 
watch at a price they can afford, to prevent such services as Justin.tv from growing further 
than they have already, or at least for such growth not to signal decline in commercial 
services. As things currently stand many fans are being priced out of watching the game of 
football, and the rising availability of free to watch online streams is only going to increase 
the lure of not paying. This is something the English Premier League should definitely be 
anxious about, and as Nick Hornby eloquently puts it when talking about the core of fans 
who create the atmosphere at football games, ‘without them nobody else would bother 
coming’.34 
 
After Setanta (?): A Future ‘Blue’ Sky Scenario 
 
Rupert Murdoch bought MySpace in July 2005 for $580m US (then £331m).
35
 Estimated 
advertising revenues from this free to view content service for the three following years were 
around the $900m US mark. The demise of Setanta at least in part indicates a declining 
confidence in the capacity of subscription based sports television to repay the huge sums 
involved in buying up the rights to the matches such subscriptions entitle viewers to watch. 
This is in part at least the result of free alternatives. Perhaps a rational Sky boss might look at 
the profit margins on his purchase of MySpace and compare this to the profits generated after 
paying out for TV rights and decide that the next time around he’ll put his money into buying 
Justin.tv instead and make an advertising deal to charge for the eye-balls drawn to such free-
content live-streams. Having said this, MySpace has now been overtaken by Facebook as the 
most densely populated social networking service. Any calculation of the value of Justin.tv to 
a potential buyer must take account of the relatively short life-cycle of any such technological 
service. Even if live-streaming continues there is no guarantee that any particular provider 
will remain predominant or even popular. The speed with which live streaming may give way 
to something entirely new can also not be predicted. The only thing for sure is that is is likely 
to be faster than we expect. User loyalty cannot be relied upon. Whether users of such 
services migrate away from sites whenever they become overly identified with the 
commercial exploitation of their users, or because technological developments render any 
particular service or service model subject to rapid replacement things will not remain static. 
Whatever the future holds, and however Rupert Murdoch decides to place his bets on the 
future, it would certainly be naïve for any sport to rely on his loyalty as regards the payment 
of broadcast rights revenues, and certainly not at current levels. It is likely that someone will 
pay for the rights to broadcast English Premiership football come 2013, but it is very likely 
that the price will have fallen dramatically. The consequences for the English ‘elite’ game of 
  
such a contraction in funding will be significant, but, given the current situation, where half 
these clubs are already in a state of technical insolvency, it may be suggested that the years of 
plenty were squandered anyway, so the loss may not be as disastrous as might be imagined.  
 
Conclusions 
 
If CDs opened up a digital gold mine for the recording industry from 1982, the same 
began for football ten years later. In music the digital revolution started to threaten 
established commercial players from the late 1990s and from 1999 in particular with the 
advent of the original Napster. The ten year gap between the digital explosions in music and 
football leads us to expect the backlash to have begun in 2009, and the evidence presented 
here certainly supports this view. Football fan loyalty may be more resilient than is that of 
music fans, and the notion of club seems to bind fans, players, managers and owners in 
football in a way that does not operate in music (where bands are often disassociated from 
their management in the minds of fans). However, this linkage in football cannot be assumed 
to be unbreakable, and the ultra commercialization of elite football may break this 
relationship in the very act of trying to exploit it for all it can be made to be worth. If 
increased prices for live attendance invert traditional patterns of attendance relative to 
socioeconomic demographics then many traditional fans are likely to turn to live-streaming 
as a means of following teams they are priced out of paying to see. Quite what the 
consequences of such a development will be, and whether this is what will happen, remain 
uncertain. What is known is that a purely profit driven approach to fan based cultural 
industries is deeply myopic. Within the epilogue of Giulianotti and Robertson's examination 
of globalization and football, and on almost the penultimate page, the authors note the 
potential significance of new and yet under researched topics for the future of 'the global 
game'. They write: '... consumer 'piracy' may become more prominent and difficult to police 
as the transnational level, for example as individual viewers erode national pay-TV networks 
by freely accessing live matches through foreign internet platforms'.
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 In this article, we have 
sought to substantiate the significance of Giulianotti and Robertson's tentative suggestion.  
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